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Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which triangulation takes place 
within the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) process at the Bank of England. 
Triangulation is at its most basic, the mixing of two or more methods, investigators, 
theories, methodologies or data in a single investigation. More specifically, we argue 
for triangulation as a commitment in research design to the mixing of methods in 
the act of inference. The paper argues that there are many motivations for 
triangulation as well as types of triangulation. It is argued that there is evidence of 
extensive triangulation of different types within the MPC process. However, there is 
very little theoretical triangulation present; raising concerns about pluralism. Also, 
it is argued that the triangulation which occurs is mainly undertaken for pragmatic 
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There has been a growing concern that one single method is inadequate for investigating 
complex social phenomena. Thus, there has been interest in several quarters, including in 
government agencies (such as research councils) and academic departments in the 
feasibility of mixing methods in a process of triangulation. In a series of papers, we have 
investigated the philosophical and methodological rationale for triangulation (Downward 
and Mearman, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005); and we have attempted to show triangulation in 
action, particularly in investigating pricing (Downward and Mearman, 2003). 
Specifically, we have argued that triangulation offers a potential solution to the impasse 
between the mainstream monist formalist ‘deductivist’ approach and the approach of 
critics – such as critical realists – who seem to imply rejection of mainstream methods. In 
this way, we work in the spirit of pluralism in economics as advocated by, for instance, 
Dow (1985 et passim). For us, triangulation operates within what might be called a 
Keynesian or ‘Babylonian’ approach (Dow, 1985). 
 
This paper expands upon our earlier work, by investigating motivations for triangulation. 
Most significantly, it investigates the always topical and – often controversial – process 
of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), and more specifically, the support for this 
process provided by the Bank of England, behind the setting of interest rates. This task is 
warranted because of the frequent claims (see, for example, Dow, 2004; Backhouse, 
2005) that the Bank is an example (albeit rare) of economists using triangulation. Such an 
investigation is easier now given the greater transparency of the process following the 
independence of the Bank from other arms of government in 1997. We argue: 1) that 
there are many examples of triangulation within the MPC process; but that 2) most of 
these are of a weak form, involving mainly data triangulation, mainly for pragmatic 
reasons; and that (3) the Bank lacks a coherent framework for mixing methods to the 
extent to which it does. The paper proceeds as follows: first, types of triangulation are 
discussed. Second, motives for triangulation, as found in the existing literature, are 
explored. Third, the Bank of England’s MPC process of forecasting inflation is evaluated 
in terms of types of and motivations for triangulation.  
 
2. TYPES OF AND MOTIVES FOR TRIANGULATION 
 
2.1 Types of triangulation 
 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge comments received at a staff seminar at the University of the West of England in 
November 2004. In particular, we acknowledge detailed and helpful comments received from Peter 
Howells. We acknowledge the participants at a session at the conference of the Association for Heterodox 
Economics at City University, London in July 2005. In particular we should like to thank Victoria Chick 
for her discussion of the paper. Thanks also to Geoffrey Church. We also acknowledge the comments of 
Kevin Butler of the Bank of England. All views expressed here are the authors’ and do not reflect the view 
of the Bank. All remaining errors are our own. Triangulation as an applied concept derives from navigation and surveying, whereupon 
taking measurements from two separate locations one can derive, or predict, a third 
measurement or location
2. In social research, in its broadest sense triangulation implies 
combining together multiple insights in an investigation
3. However, this simple definition 
of triangulation masks a range of its meanings and uses. This section presents a non-
exhaustive classification of types of triangulation. 
 
The simplest form of triangulation is also the least extensive, and indeed may not at first 
appear to be triangulation. It is the employment of judgement by the economist about 
their model, tool, theory or data. For example, an economist might use an econometric 
model (which often they have created) to produce an estimation. They could in principle, 
passively receive the information from the model, simply report this result and stop their 
investigation. However, they can be more active, and apply their judgement to the result, 
perhaps to interpret it in a specific way. This employment of judgement can be 
interpreted as the interaction of economist with model, and thus is a form of triangulation. 
Dow (2004) notes that the use of judgement becomes crucial when faced with 
‘Keynesian’ unquantifiable uncertainty. 
 
Denzin (1970) offers four main types of triangulation. Data triangulation is when 
different sets (and often types) of data are combined. Different types of data might be 
used; for example, survey data might be used alongside time series data. Additionally, the 
data could be differentiated spatially or temporally. Thus, the insights of a person at 
different times could be triangulated to make an inference about the whole time period. 
Clearly, also, different people could be asked once, but at different times. An example 
would be the combination of survey and interview data.  
 
Investigator triangulation is the combination of insights from multiple investigators on 
the same subject. Imagine three people in the dark examining an unknown object. If the 
men perceive that they feel a tail, a thick upright rough surface, and a ivory object, they 
might infer that they have, respectively, a donkey, a tree (or umbrella stand) or a horn to 
be played. However, the combination of the insights leads the three to conclude that the 
mystery object is an elephant. Examples of this type of triangulation abound: for 
example, the replication or repeated trials of a study, or the seeking of a second opinion, 
are common techniques in medical research. The recent advances in cell biology, 
particularly in the discovery of how cells move proteins through a specific pathway in 
order to be able to secrete them from the cell (see Pelham, 2001; Del Rio et al, 2004), is 
an example of triangulation in ‘natural science’. 
                                                 
2 Blaikie (1991) has some reservations about the appropriateness of this nautical or surveying analogy to 
social science. One related criticism of the term is that triangulation implies a precision which is unjustified 
in social research. An alternative terminology is of “mixed methods” (Downward and Mearman, 2005); 
pluralist (Dow, 2004); or Babylonian (Dow, 1985). However, the term triangulation is well established 
now, justifying its use. 
3 It is clear that many of the most prominent economists, particularly Smith and Marshall, have broadly 
engaged in triangulation, as they drew upon different evidential bases and arguments. Moreover, it can be 
argued that, as evidenced by Laidler (1993), a process of triangulation – in this case, the combination of 
methods and data types – led directly to the conclusion that the demand for money function is unstable (see 
140).  
In the case of multiple investigators, each may have their own prior theory, or theoretical 
paradigms, whose insights are then combined (in various different ways) to reach a 
collective conclusion. In the literature this is known as theoretical triangulation (Denzin, 
1970). Such theoretical triangulation can also take place within an individual, who might 
analyse a finding from multiple perspectives.  
 
Denzin’s (1970) fourth type of triangulation is methodological triangulation, which 
involves the combination of different methods. A weak form of methodological 
triangulation can be what Denzin calls within-method triangulation, in which different 
varieties of the same method are combined. An example of this might the triangulation of 
VARs with different specifications or different lag lengths. More adventurous is between-
method triangulation, which involves the use of different methods in combination. 
Between-method triangulation is challenging because it often involves the combination of 
different underlying methodologies: for example, the combination of an econometric 
study with a discourse analysis combines methods based on opposed philosophical 
bases
4. Our preferred definition adopts the most adventurous position. For us, 
triangulation is: the prior commitment in research design to investigation and inference 
via the mixing of methods. That, then, is the implicit standard by which apparent 
triangulation is assessed. However, in discussing the Bank of England’s practices, all of 
the pre-existing definitions will be used. 
 
It is our evaluation that, in the economic mainstream, generally it is the case that 
triangulation, beyond the interaction of modeller and model, is limited. The relative lack 
of triangulation might reflect positivist philosophical underpinnings (see Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). More likely, the lack of triangulation results from the 
widely held belief that certain types of method necessarily have higher statistical power; 
and that wherever possible such methods should be used. Sophisticated developments of 
regression analysis are the best example, perhaps because of their claimed analogy to 
controlled experiments.  
 
2.2 Motives for triangulation 
 
Types of triangulation are just one part of the story. In order to evaluate the Bank’s 
practices, we also need to ascertain their motives for their actions. A range of motives for 
triangulation can be found in the literature. One of the most common is the rationale that 
often data are incomplete or inadequate, and that it is necessary to use different data types 
                                                 
4 Typically, it is viewed as controversial to combine different methodologies, because this involves 
ontological and epistemological clashes. For example, quantitative data is based on an empiricist ontology, 
whereas qualitative data is derived from the presupposition that reality is exhausted by meanings. For the 
proponent of quantitative data, qualitative data are not subject to measurement and thus are useless; 
whereas for the qualitative researcher, it is impossible to measure meanings, and thus quantitative analysis 
is useless. It is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve this clash. However, elsewhere (Downward and 
Mearman, 2005) have argued that the ontological clash can be removed if an ontology of complex objects 
residing in deep structures is adopted. Specifically, they (see also Downward and Mearman, 2002) argue 
that the Critical-Realist logic of retroduction inherently involves triangulation, because various empirical 
methods can illuminate both what Critical Realists refer to as the empirical and real domains of reality. to fill the gaps in the original data set. For example, gaps in time series are often filled 
with estimates. Additionally, errors in data night be corrected or taken into account by 
using other data.  
 
The tactic of econometricians of re-estimating equations under different specifications is 
an appeal to the above argument; however, estimating multiple equations can also be 
interpreted as an appeal to the law of large numbers. There is an implicit claim made that 
increased numbers of confirming estimations increases the ‘validity’ of the estimation 
and/or underlying theory (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).  
 
Triangulation can also occur for political reasons. If an investigation is being carried out 
amongst a group, as is often the case, in order to convince each participant that their input 
is valued, it may be that some part of each party’s view is incorporated into the group 
action. This satisfies all stakeholders involved; and it can unwittingly admit theoretical or 
even methodological triangulation. Another political factor is that the research group may 
have a clear (explicit or implicit) view that pluralism ought to be practised.  
 
Support for pluralism could be based on a prior conviction; but equally it could be based 
on epistemological grounds: for example, if the research group adopts a fallibilist 
position. Fallibilism is the view that all theories, views, models, etc. are inherently 
fallible and that no grounds exist for judging any view completely correct. Often, it is 
recognised that no single theory, or more often, one single investigator, has the 
computational capacity to deal with the myriad facts in a complex environment. Equally, 
such fallibilism may be simply the product of a pragmatic evaluation of experience: if 
one’s models – whatever their formulation – have tended in the past always to be 
incorrect, the judgement is made that they are likely to be flawed in the future.  
 
Finally, there might be ontological grounds for triangulation, some of which are 
suggested above. If objects are complex, it is unlikely that any single datum or observer 
can describe them adequately. Therefore, there needs to be several observers/observations 
in different locations and/or times, so that a more complete picture can be constructed. 
Elsewhere (Downward and Mearman, 2005) we argue that in order to grasp the complex 
empirical reality and the (also complex) deeper structures of reality, different empirical 
methods are necessary. Also, I argue (2004) that in so-called open systems of reality, in 
which the degrees of closure of reality and the methods chosen to examine them are 
unlikely to match, triangulation can attempt to compensate for this mis-match by 
combining insights from various perspectives.  
 
3. TRIANGULATION AT THE BANK OF ENGLAND 
 
3.1 The Monetary Policy Committee process 
 
The processes under investigation are those surrounding the meetings of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC). The Bank, aiming for transparency, has published an extensive 
set of papers laying out the process of the MPC’s decision regarding interest rates (see, 
for example, Whitley, 1997; Britton, Fisher and Whitley, 1998; Budd, 1998; Bean, 1998; Britton, Cutler and Wardlow, 1999; King, 1999; Kohn, 2000; Bank of England, 1999, 
2000, 2003; Bean and Jenkinson, 2001; Pagan, 2003). The Bank’s publications show a 
complex, iterative process involving many different models, methods, data types and 
people, both MPC members and Bank staff. This paper is based on the interpretation of 
the Bank’s publications. 
 
The well-publicised and much-anticipated MPC monthly meetings are the end result of a 
month-long (and longer for the production of the Inflation Report) process of data 
collection, analysis, presentation and interpretation. The process involves Bank staff and 
its Agents collecting and manipulating data to be presented to the MPC, which then 
considers the information and makes its decision. The principal tool for decision-making 
is the projection of inflation. Every quarter this projection generates the lengthy official 
Inflation Report, but in other months, a projection is still required.  
 
The processes by which the Report and the monthly projections are arrived at are rather 
similar and their differences will not be considered here (cf. Britton, Fisher and Whitley, 
1998; Bean and Jenkinson, 2001). They both are iterative processes, involving a series of 
meetings, both with and apart from the MPC members, reflection on past projections, 
reconsideration of the projection model, and an amendment of the models after 
deliberation on relevant events (or data) from the relevant period. The process culminates 
in the production of a numerical projection of inflation. 
 
The final tool for use by the MPC is the “fan chart”. The fan chart is a probability 
distribution of projections (Britton et al, 1998; Bank of England, 2000). For each estimate 
of inflation (or GDP) which is produced, a probability weight is added, according to the 
MPC’s assessment of it (Budd, 1998). The whole fan chart therefore plots the range of 
outcomes considered possible by the MPC, together with their subjective assessment of 
the likelihood of those outcomes. 
 
3.2 Evidence of triangulation in the process 
 
On a cursory examination, there appears to be considerable evidence of triangulation. 
Often, the triangulation appears to be extensive; but on further analysis, it tends to be 
fairly superficial, driven by pragmatic concerns. In contrast, for us, ‘deeper’ forms of 
triangulation are those which triangulate between methodologies and which do so for 
ontological reasons. The grid below summarises our findings. In each case, the motive for 
triangulation is found in the rows; the type of triangulation is in the columns. Each box is 
either empty, indicating no basis for a judgement; or it contains ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If there is 
strong evidence for or against a type of triangulation undertaken for a specific motive, the 
yes or no becomes capitalised
5. No direct evidence at all was found relating to validity or 
the ‘law of large numbers’ as a motive, so they have been deleted. However, in the light 
of our other findings, it seems likely that both are relevant in informing the Bank’s use of 
triangulation. 
                                                 
5 Clearly, the rigour of such assessments can be questioned. More formal methods, such as content analysis, 
are available for assessing quantitatively textual data; however, any content analysis carried out here is 
somewhat informal and a matter of judgement.   
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3.2.1 Triangulation via judgement 
 
We support Dow’s (2004) and Cobham’s (2003) opinion that judgement is an important 
part of the Bank of England process. Indeed, the Bank’s own literature portrays the 
generation of forecasts as a process of judgement working in tandem with formal 
modelling. Whitley (1997: 165) cites approvingly Higgins’ comments on Bryant et al 
(1988), that “a formal and quantified framework is an irreplaceable adjunct to the process 
of policy thought”; i.e., thought has primacy. Moreover, the projections made by the 
Bank’s models are subject to interrogation and interpretation by both Bank staff and the 
MPC. Indeed, as the Bank (2004a: 188) notes, the inflation projections are always 
ultimately the product of the MPC, not the models. Such an emphasis on judgement 
inevitably harks back to the ‘wise men [sic]’ of the pre-independence period (1993-
1997).  
 
The role of judgement introduces a distinctly human element to the setting of interest 
rates. Budd (1998) argues that a decision-maker’s mood will always affect the 
interpretation of a model. Thus, a MPC member’s decision about the interest rate will be complex. It will be informed by their interpretation of the models (and other data) 
presented to them, and by other data they have seen, or by their own modelling done prior 
to the meeting. Their decision will also be affected by their pre-suppositions about the 
economy and about what their role is in it. Cobham (2003) shows that different 
preferences among participants in meetings will affect the final decision taken. However, 
also, their decision will be affected by their own feeling or intuition about the current 
economic situation. For example, Cobham shows that some members of the MPC have 
been instinctively more active than others. Some may have a preference for lower 
inflation than others (although Cobham: 481 discounts the importance of possible 
different preferences for stability). Some might be more concerned about doing what the 
markets expect (see Bell-Kelton, 2005, for a lengthy discussion of this). Finally, some 
might be feeling optimistic about the economy, while others will be pessimistic: Bell-
Kelton shows how within the US Federal Reserve’s Open Market (operations) 
Committee (FOMC), two camps emerged, one optimistic ‘elves’, the other pessimistic 
‘wolves’. All of this suggests a process in which psychology is significant. 
 
3.2.2 Investigator triangulation 
 
The effect of the MPC members using their judgement is multiplied by their interaction. 
The MPC listens to the evidence presented to them; each member presents their 
assessment of the evidence and their subsequent recommendations; and eventually they 
vote. MPC meetings “explore all possible views on the cause and significance of recent 
economic developments” (Budd: 1789). The final projection arrived at is therefore the 
product of discussion and negotiation amongst the committee. The committee might not 
reach a unanimous decision – very often it does not – but its decision can be said to be 
“collegiate” (Whitley, 1997: 170); a “collective examination of forces shaping the 
outlook to come to a conclusion that belongs to most of the [MPC]” (Kohn, 2000: 24-25).  
 
Although the MPC’s decision is collective, clearly the internal dynamics of the 
committee will affect that final decision. More research is required on that, and little is 
revealed in the meetings’ minutes; but Bell-Kelton (2005) demonstrates very clearly that 
strong personalities or perceived hierarchies of authority in a monetary policy committee 
can be significant. The ultimate authority of Chairman Greenspan seems to prevail over 
the FOMC. Similarly, in the FOMC, there seems to be some tension between ‘bankers’ 
and ‘economists’.  
 
The composition of the MPC is similarly varied. the committee as being made up of 
academic economists, professional bankers, and professional economists (all with some 
degree of academic background). It is possible that such different backgrounds produce 
different types of judgements. Cobham (2003: 485) provides some examples of this, for 
instance in (Governor) Eddie George’s apparent aversion to interest rate reversals; Buiter 
and Vickers, both academic economists, seemed more prone to make interest rate 
changes than did ‘career’ bankers. However, Cobham denies any systematic tendencies 
of types of MPC members.  
 As Dunne (1991) and Smith (1994) note, economic modelling has traditionally been done 
in teams. This tradition continues at the Bank. Bank staff are arranged into departments 
(such as Monetary Analysis) responsible for specific areas of study and for the production 
of specific data. One of the functions of these teams is to evaluate their models and their 
performance in providing accurate projections. In consultation with the MPC, the staff 
amend their models ad hoc, according to the models’ past performance (Budd, 1998; 
Pagan, 2003). Thus, the interaction within and between teams is a form of triangulation, 
and a possible source of tension in the process. Furthermore, the Bank’s agents present 
reports from around the country, for the consideration of the Bank staff and MPC 
members. Finally, the teams and the MPC discuss all of the data together: there is an 
interaction between the groups (Bank, 2004a: 188). In short, there seems to be 
considerable investigator triangulation at the Bank.  
 
3.2.3 Theoretical triangulation 
 
There are two main potential sources of theoretical triangulation. One is the fact that 
every member of the Bank staff and the MPC will have (possibly subconscious) 
theoretical presuppositions which they impose on the evidence they interpret. Second, the 
Bank’s suite of models may display theoretical diversity.  
 
There are several ways in which the first could occur. It is clearly possible that different 
members of the MPC may have different theoretical backgrounds which they bring into 
the process. As discussed above, Cobham (2003) shows that debates between economists 
and bankers bring in different perspectives on the economy and the role of the Bank
6. 
However, in general, it is our view that although there have been small differences 
between the perspectives of members, in the wider spectrum of perspectives available, 
these differences are small. Second, there might be differences in outlook between 
different Bank staff; however, we have found little evidence of this, which in any case 
would be difficult to assess given the mainly technical nature of the research of Bank 
staff.  
 
The second source of theoretical triangulation would be through the use of multiple 
models with different theoretical bases, or a theoretically pluralistic model. Smith (1994) 
notes that there was a macro-modelling industry in the 1980s. Effectively, a competition 
took place between different macro-models, usually based in different universities with 
different traditions in economics. For example, Cambridge models were Keynesian, 
while the Liverpool, London Business School and City University Business School 
models were strictly monetarist or New Classical (Dunne, 1991; Wallis et al, 1986). The 
Bank recognises that the theoretically distinct models of the 1970s and 1980s performed 
poorly and that theoretical coherence (as found in the 1980s model) can conflict with 
                                                 
6 On the other hand, perceived differences in theoretical perspective tend to be accentuated more by 
academic economists than others. This could work in two ways: one, academic economists could stress 
differences, making them appear larger than they are, creating the impression of greater diversity than 
actually exists; two, non-academic economists might downplay paradigm differences and present actually 
quite different views as being quite similar, creating more apparent consensus than is actually present. 
What actually happens is an empirical question. empirical coherence (the ability to provide good forecasts). Thus, a balance must be 
struck and a slightly broader model was required (Britton et al, 1998; Pagan, 2003; Bank 
of England, 2003). This is an enforced pluralism. Thus, main Bank model is more 
pragmatically constructed and less easy to neatly categorise into, a narrow theoretical 
camp than previously. The same observation can be made about some of the auxiliary 
models. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in practice, there is in evidence little theoretical 
diversity. Within the modelling process, there is scope for alternative assumptions to be 
made, but the alterations tend to be of a fairly minor nature.  
 
Arestis and Sawyer (2002) analysed the theoretical structure of the Medium-Term 
Macroeconomic Model (MTMM), which was until recently the Bank’s main 
macroeconometric model. According to Arestis and Sawyer, the MTMM had a number of 
key features: long run equilibrium, with short run dynamics captured by ECMs (see also 
Pagan, 2003); Cobb-Douglas production functions; vertical Phillips curve at the NAIRU; 
sluggish adjustment of nominal and real variables; and significantly, money supply 
endogeneity. The model is emblematic of the “new consensus” on money and 
macroeconomics. Moreover, Sawyer (private) suggests that there have been shifts in 
more subtle ways, for example in the movement from investment functions which were 
more Kaleckian (emphasising profits as well as capacity utilisation) to neo-classical 
(where investment depends on the price of capital as well as capacity utilisation) 
formulations.  
 
In response to Pagan’s (2003) criticisms, the Bank has replaced the MTMM with a new 
Bank of England Quarterly Model (BEQM; see Bank, 2004a). As yet, no systematic 
study to mirror Arestis and Sawyer’s (2002) has been carried out. However, a cursory 
analysis of the model suggests that it is highly similar to the MTMM in its theoretical 
orientation. It maintains a ‘new consensus’ approach, i.e., it is a New Keynesian-
orthodox hybrid emphasising optimising behaviour, steady state long run outcomes, a 
vertical long-run Phillips curve, structural determinants of industrial competition, open 
economy, balanced budgets, a simple monetary policy rule geared to an inflation target, 
and wage and price inertia. Indeed, the Bank (2004a: 189) states explicitly that the new 
model does not reflect or represent a desire by the Bank to change its view of the 
structure of the economy. Thus, Arestis and Sawyer’s comments about the MTMM apply 
almost without exception to the BEQM.  
 
The only substantial difference between the BEQM and the MTMM is on expectations. 
Expectations played a minimal role in the MTMM, although that might be for practical 
reasons of data unavailability. Expectations were considered, for instance, in the 
transmission mechanism from interest rates (Bank of England, 1999); however, they 
mainly play a role in creating inertia in nominal and real variables (Arestis and Sawyer, 
2002: 532) or (implicitly) as bringing about equilibrium. This deployment of expectations 
had a very classical flavour to it. In contrast, for Keynesians, confidence plays a crucial 
role, for example as a determinant of investment. The BEQM incorporates short term 
expectations of demand to affect investment Bank of England (2004a: 189); however, the 
main determinants of investment remain the cost of capital and expected return. There is 
a greater and more sophisticated role for expectations in the BEQM than in the MTMM. However, the theory of expectations within that model is somewhat unclear. It is 
acknowledged that agents have neither perfect foresight nor full information (2004a:191); 
but the model falls short of rejecting rational expectations.  
 
Overall, therefore, there is little evidence of theoretical triangulation. It seems that there 
is a broad consensus among those involved behind this model as the main tool for 
policymaking. Budd (1998) claims that alternative assumptions, when used, are deployed 
to explore why forecasts have been inaccurate. Ideally, it seems, a single effective 
paradigm, on which everyone agrees, would simplify the process of projection 
considerably (Whitley, 1997; Pagan, 2003: 16). Whilst alternative paradigms might sneak 
in – for instance via the forecasts of outside economists (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001), 
which are used as a comparison for the Bank’s forecast – there is no commitment to 
theoretical pluralism or to theoretical triangulation
7. 
 
3.2.4 Data triangulation 
 
The Bank’s use of different data types is perhaps its clearest example of triangulation. 
The main source of data for the MPC is that produced by the suite of models, principally, 
a macro-model. That main model initially tries to create a current picture of the economy, 
based on National Accounts data. However, this data is somewhat outdated, capturing 
past not current conditions, given the lag in the collection and collation of the raw data 
(Britton, et al, 1999; Bean and Jenkinson, 2001; Pagan, 2003). Thus, for the most current 
information on existing conditions and trends, other data are required. Furthermore, the 
Bank is concerned about measurement error and the consequent revision of incorrect past 
data (see Harrison, Kapetanios and Yates, 2004; and Kapetanios and Yates, 2004, for 
discussions of how to improve forecasts by taking into account measurement error in past 
data). These concerns about data open the door to triangulation, albeit merely based on 
the grounds of data deficiency. 
 
At the series of meetings preceding the main meeting, the MPC undertakes a complete 
reassessment of all the relevant evidence, and peruses data on, for example, labour 
markets, monetary conditions, demand, output, prices, and financial markets. Much of it 
is basically descriptive. Some of it might be termed “historical” (Bank, 2004b), whilst 
other data is much more recent (Budd, 1998). The MPC has the opportunity to analyse 
sectoral, regional and international data which the Bank deems relevant (Kohn, 2000; 
Bank, 2004b). Much of this data is on emerging trends. This is data not covered in the 
National Accounts. In particular, the Bank utilises independent non-governmental survey 
data (see Britton, et al, 1999; Budd, 1998; Whitley, 1997). Such data might have been 
collected at different times and places from the official data. Typically, the Bank uses 
surveys on business (state of trade surveys: Britton, et al, 1999) and consumer confidence 
and sentiment (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001). For example, the Bank employs the CBI 
Industrial Trends survey, which is used to ascertain position of the economy in its cycle 
(Britton, et al, 1999). The Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey can capture some of the 
trends in consumer spending (Bank, 2004b).  
                                                 
7 The suite of models includes small ‘analytical’ models. These models are most commonly based on 
optimising assumptions: more evidence of limited use of competing perspectives.  
Reports by the Bank’s staff utilise a wide range of sources, including press news reports, 
which focus on current specific significant events. A recent past example is the 
demutualization of the building societies. These events can affect the degree of 
uncertainty of the Bank’s forecasts and can bias the fan chart (Budd, 1998; Britton, et al, 
1999). These current events also assist the staff in choosing which data should be 
presented to the MPC and thereby which issues should be discussed (Budd, 1998). These 
presentations are supplemented by data collected from other organisations, such as 
building societies, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), research institutes, 
trades unions and economists from academic and commercial organisations (Bean and 
Jenkinson, 2001). These data sources show other examples of triangulation of opinions 
and people.  
 
Furthermore, the data from different organisations are often of different types: the RICS 
data tends to be on recent house price data, and is often based on recent surveys by RICS 
members; building societies draw on recent mortgage completions. On the other hand, 
data from other economists is of a more conventional type, often being competing 
forecasts with which the Bank’s forecasts are compared. Particular attention is paid to 
forecasts and other data from other central banks (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001). Also, the 
data might have been collected in different ways from the official data.  
 
A similar role in the decision-making process is played by reports from the Bank’s 
Agents around the UK. The Agents’ principle task (in this context) is to visit UK firms 
(they make 7000 such visits each year: King, 1999: 10) to gather information. The Bank 
values the information they collect in the same way as survey data: it is timely and fills 
gaps which would otherwise exist (King, 1999). Indeed, because it tends to be more 
anecdotal (Budd, 1998; Bank, 2004b), it is the most recent data at the Bank’s disposal on 
current economic conditions. Firms can report to agents their stock levels, recent changes 
in demand, their expectations of inflation and above all, their confidence about the 
economy and their subsequent intentions for investment. Typically, in each MPC meeting 
round, data from 150-200 agents’ reports are presented for consideration (King, 1999; 
Bean and Jenkinson, 2001).  
 
Obviously, the Bank does use several types of data from a number of different sources. It 
does practice data triangulation. Clearly the main motives for doing so are pragmatic: 
official data is often incomplete and/or inaccurate, and suffers from being always 
backward-looking and lagged. Thus other data is required to correct for measurement 
error and to create a more complete picture. How that data is treated is crucial for 
assessing the extent of methodological triangulation.  
 
3.2.5 Methodological triangulation 
 
To reiterate, Denzin (1970) distinguishes between within-method and between-method 
triangulation. Within-method triangulation is based on the premise that two trials of the 
same test are better than one: it is an inductive exercise. Between-method triangulation 
involves the mixing of different methods and is therefore, methodologically at least, more significant. However, between-method triangulation can also be sub-divided: one can 
observe the mixing of methods which come from the same methodology (within-
methodology) or from different methodological foundations (between-methodologies). 
That raises questions about how the methods are to be combined, and whether one type of 
method has primacy. These questions are crucial in understanding the process of the 
MPC. 
 
The uncertainty over model specification, and over the reliability of one single model – 
all pragmatic concerns about past poor performance, but also hints at fallibilism – have 
led to an “eclectic” approach (Whitley, 1997), in which models are combined. The Bank 
does not rely on one model: rather, it has a ‘suite of models’ approach. This is common 
practice in central banks (Kohn, 2000; Pagan, 2003). The suite includes a main model, 
such as the BEQM, which provides the ‘big picture’. The main model provides the initial 
average projection of inflation, based on the average response of the model to average 
shocks (Whitley, 1997). In addition, a set of as many as thirty-two ‘auxiliary’ (Whitley, 
also uses the term ‘analytical’) models, such as a Real Business Cycle model, a labour 
market model and others to model specific sectors, providing more specific sectoral or 
regional information, add detail which allows the projections of the model to be adjusted.  
 
For example, a small, five-equation macroeconomic forecasting model is employed 
(Whitley, 1997), in order to supplement the main model. Other simple, stylised 
macroeconomic models are used, to provide an overall picture of the economy. Simple 
two equation output gap models are also used (Whitley, 1997). Moreover, a range of 
model types is used, including time-varying component models, structural VARs, 
Bayesian VARs and factor models (Whitley; Budd, 1998; Pagan, 2003). Pagan claims 
that different models are used for different purposes. One such example is the use of 
VARs for assigning the probabilities of shocks (Whitley). The smaller models are used to 
fill the vacuum – partly in confidence – left by the large-scale models of the 1980s 
(Whitley). Final estimates and forecasts would seem, therefore, to result from a 
combination of inferences from these other models. 
 
Overall, methodological triangulation seems considerable. A selection of models is used 
from within the range of formal models (within-method triangulation). Within each type 
a range of modelling techniques is utilised (within-method). A large number of auxiliary 
models add considerable specific detail to the information set available to the MPC. From 
above, the range of data types used indicates between-method triangulation. The surveys 
used tend to be informed by conventional positivist principles; but the anecdotal evidence 
presented by Agents is informed by interpretivist philosophy, suggesting between-
methodology triangulation. However, this interpretation must be tempered considerably, 
because of the way the models are employed.  
 
A crucial question regarding triangulation is how the triangulated data (or models, etc.) 
are to be combined. There is no easy formula for this. In (between-)methodological 
triangulation, no assumption is made of the inherent superiority of any methods. As 
Downward and Mearman (2004, 2005) argue, the specifics of the question being asked 
will determine the method chosen. The Bank has no stated formula for combining data types, so one must be inferred. The treatment of the models used by the Bank suggests 
that a fairly clear hierarchy of models exists and that the projection process is geared 
around those models at the top of the hierarchy. Specifically, the main macroeconomic 
model is the driver of the process. This position is very clear in the Bank (2004a) in 
which the BEQM is described as the “main tool in the suite of models” (188; emphasis 
added) the Bank uses and is the “primary organisational framework” (188; emphasis 
added) for assisting the judgements of the MPC. Other models are largely adjuncts to the 
main model (Whitley, 1997).  
 
As a corollary, the data type preferred by the Bank is a time series of official quantitative 
data, collected in the usual way. Other data types are adjuncts to the preferred data. These 
supplementary data would not, ideally, be used, but the lags and gaps in official data 
necessitate a search for other, less reliable data. Overall, while the Bank would prefer to 
use only regularly quantified official data, they are forced to take into account other data 
types, partly because of data inadequacy and also for pragmatic reasons of poor past 
performance. A few examples illustrate the point. The quarterly forecast is “explicitly 
quantitative” (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001: 438) as is the fan chart. Admittedly, the initial 
modal forecast from the model can be adjusted in the light of other information. 
However, only information which will have a “quantitatively significant” effect on the 
forecast is considered by the MPC (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001: 439). According to 
Whitley (1997), the analytical models provide qualitative data for input into the other 
(macro) models; this data will be transformed into a quantitative form or used as proxies 
for unavailable data (Britton, et al, 1999). As Whitley notes, only quantifiable shocks can 
be included in models. Indeed, this is considered necessary, for survey data to be put to 
its “best use” (Britton et al: 179). Survey data is kept in a time series and compared with 
other time series data (Britton et al). Quantification occurs via correlation and regression 
with other quantitative data (Britton et al). Similarly, the CBI Business Optimism 
Balance, a measure of business confidence, is regressed against lags of itself and other 
variables (e.g. GDP). Thus, while the merits of surveys per se are acknowledged by the 
Bank, in the end they are subsumed under the main, quantitative model. The survey data 
have to be subordinated to the quantitative methods, which are apparently superior and 
more powerful. 
 
These statements suggest a clear hierarchy of data and models, with the quantitative 
macro models at the top. In this light, Higgins’ comment on Bryant et al, quoted above, 
that quantitative and formal analyses are an “irreplaceable adjunct to the process of 
policy thought” (Whitley, 1997: 165) looks rather different. Rather, policy thought is 
based around quantitative analysis; the thought almost looks like an adjunct to the 
quantitative analysis, in spite of the many stresses of the role of judgement in Bank 
literature. Such an approach is consistent with the way in which methods are used 
throughout economics: certain methods have a higher power and intrinsically more value; 
and therefore, studies conducted with those methods consequently also have a higher 
value. However, the open-systems arguments underpinning triangulation suggest that this 
is not the case: methods only have power if they are appropriate to their object.  
 
3.3 Analysis of motives for triangulation at the Bank  
Whereas Cobham (2003) and Dow (2004) focus on the motives and underlying 
conditions for types of decisions taken by the MPC, this paper has taken a twin approach 
to the analysis of the MPC process. A taxonomic account of the types of methods used, 
and how they are employed, is combined with an analysis of the motivations behind those 
actions. This allows us to argue that although there is considerable evidence of 
triangulation, particularly of some forms of it, significant questions can be asked about 
why. 
 
As Table 1 shows, our analysis finds clear evidence for certain types of motivations. It is 
very clear that a concern about data inadequacy has led the Bank to employ several 
different types of data from diverse sources. In addition, to the extent that it engages in 
methodological triangulation, much of this occurs (indirectly) through the uses of 
different types of data, such as anecdotes presented by Agents. This too is inspired by 
concern about the adequacy of published official data. It does not seem driven by concern 
about formal modelling, either in terms of its ability to provide forecasts (although this is 
relevant later) or in terms of its applicability in open systems contexts. 
 
There is some evidence that ‘political’ factors such as satisfying the stakeholders 
involved, is relevant to the extent of investigator triangulation. However, it is less clear 
how the internal politics of the MPC affect outcomes or affects the choice of methods 
used. The choice of methods seems to be a product of organisational convention, self-
evaluation, observation of other comparable organisations, and independent evaluation 
(for example the Kohn, 2000, and Pagan, 2003 reports). Further, there seems to be little 
evidence of the overriding desire for pluralism per se. As argued above, little theoretical 
diversity is present – indeed, the main macro- model seems to be moving away from 
pluralism – and the innovations of different data types and auxiliary models is an ad hoc 
response to practical problems.  
 
Indeed, pragmatic responses to epistemological problems seem to be the main drivers of 
the current approach. The Bank’s process evolves relative to the quality of past 
performance. Different data types are necessary because of the existing current practical 
limitations of official data. Judgement is necessary because the models cannot be relied 
upon as yet to provide good enough forecasts on their own. The job of creating forecasts 
is too large and too complex to rely on individuals. Past large-scale models, which relied 
on one very narrow theoretical structure, have been unsuccessful in prediction and policy 
application (Whitley, 1997). Smaller models which provide detailed information on 
specific sectors augment the admittedly and inevitably limited main model. The Bank is 
cognisant that all models are abstractions from the complex reality which cannot possibly 
capture all the relevant features of the economy; consequently, they are careful not to rely 
too heavily on models (Bean and Jenkinson, 2001; Bank of England, 2003) 
 
Of course, such concerns are not merely practical. They are epistemological positions. 
There is some evidence in the Bank literature of an awareness of the fallibility of models 
and of theory. Whitley (1997) claims that the Bank is more cautious in its claims partly 
because modellers in the 1980s contributed to the mistrust about models by making too strong claims about their models and by refusing to acknowledge their limitations. On the 
other hand, the Bank’s approach effectively engages in inference from a single model, 
supported by other models. There is an overriding desire that the process be geared 
towards one effective model (Pagan, 2003), if only one could be found.  
 
Second, in the Bank’s process there seems to be an implicit faith in the main model, 
which undermines the impression of fallibilism discussed earlier. There is insufficient 
recognition that the main model might be inherently – fundamentally – flawed, and that 
its initial central projection might be seriously misleading. That is problematic because of 
the inevitable path dependency in the final formulation of the inflation projection, given 
that the other models are used only to tweak the projection of the main model. Thus, the 
concern underpinning triangulation, that all methods are flawed and must be combined 
with other methods, is weakened. 
 
Dow (2004) argues that, particularly in the face of unquantifiable uncertainty, ordinary 
human logic, relying on intuition, common sense and judgement, becomes crucial for 
decision making. Dow (1995) notes that people must act, but that when faced with such 
uncertainty, they lack a clear rational strategy and can be paralysed. She argues that 
making decisions on monetary policy is an example of such necessary action under 
uncertainty. Dow (2004) identifies four types of uncertainty relevant to the macro-
modelling problem: additive, in which the variance of error term increases; 
multiplicative, in which there is uncertainty about the parameter values and hence about 
the model itself; there might also be uncertainty about the structure of the model. In all 
three cases, the uncertainty is caused by randomness either in nature or in the 
understanding of the economist. Dow is most interested in a fourth form of uncertainty, in 
which the economist’s understanding is simply limited and “where it is regarded as 
intractable to formalise he choice between all possible models” (2004: 547). In this case, 
uncertainty is not measurable and thus cannot be incorporated into the model’s 
specification. Dow argues that in this fourth case, there is a need for judgement.  
 
Dow (2004) goes on to claim that judgement is and must be a fundamental feature of 
monetary policy-making. She cites the fact that the Bank constructs a fan chart which, 
she says, is a quantified expression of judgement. The final projection is thus an average 
of those offered in the discussion during the various stages of meetings and data analysis, 
as described above. The Bank’s desire for a range of projections reflects their caution 
about making firm predictions. The range of the chart embodies the inherent uncertainty 
in the forecasting process (Kohn, 2000). This level of uncertainty increases and decreases 
with the current period’s economic news; however, even in a period of relative economic 
stability (as was the case in particular prior to 11
th September, 2001), by using the fan 
chart the Bank pays heed to fallibilism and also to the ever-present possibility of 
unanticipated shocks to the economy. 
 
Moreover, the general level of uncertainty is augmented by paying attention to specific 
risks (Whitley, 1997; Britton et al, 1998). While the general uncertainty is embodied in 
the spread of the distribution, specific risks can lead to the mean of the distribution 
shifting. An integral part of the process is that structural changes and/or specific events are assessed, a priori and consequently, ad hoc, the centre of the fan chart can shift up or 
down, depending on the assessment. For example, news of house price increases often 
leads to a shift upwards in the central projection of inflation. This process of adjustment 
of the fan chart is therefore an iterative one (Britton, et al, 1998), incorporating learning 
from past forecasting errors and the a priori assessment of the likely quantitative effect of 
specific changes in the economy.  
 
Fundamentally, of course, the MPC uses its judgement to evaluate the need for action. 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the Bank acknowledges uncertainty as 
licensing judgement and indeed the triangulation of investigators and methods. Cobham 
(2003) considers the effect of uncertainty on the MPC’s decision. He concludes that 
uncertainty may be slightly more influential in creating ‘no change’ decisions
8. More 
generally, Whitley (1997) states that a reason for using judgement is that there is 
uncertainty about the underlying structure of the economy and therefore about the 
appropriateness of the model. Further, a standard practice in the Bank process is that the 
main model is estimated under different assumptions. This usually involves changing 
model parameters or values of variables. These changes of assumption occur most often 
in order to produce new forecasts (Kohn, 2000) which can be incorporated into the fan 
chart (Budd, 1998). The changes arise because of model uncertainty (Whitley).  
 
In terms of ontology, there is limited evidence that this is driving the process or 
triangulation within it. Nevertheless, there is an implicit acknowledgement within the 
Bank’s approach that the world is too complex for any single model to capture or to 
predict correctly. The Bank’s suite of models could be interpreted as a tacit strategy to 
capture different parts of the complex whole with separate models. It is not clear whether 
this complexity runs up against an epistemic constraint, or whether it is independent of 
our ability to understand it. This question relates back to Dow’s (2004) discussion of 
uncertainty: there can be randomness in the world; or, under an open, organic view, the 
world is simply too complex for any one theory or model to cope with it: there is genuine 
unquantifiable uncertainty about it. 
 
Other than an acknowledgement of complexity, there is no evidence of ontological 
concerns informing the Bank’s approach. Crucially, for us, there is no evidence of a 
commitment to or recognition of an ontology of open systems. There is little evidence 
that the Bank recognises that its models impose closure on an open reality and that this 
must be accounted for in the way the models are used. There is no admission of the 
principle that quantitative models impose greater closure than qualitative (see Downward 
and Mearman, 2002; Mearman, 2004) and that qualitative data might be more powerful 
in given circumstances. Although the use of qualitative data to assess and weigh up the 
quantitative is methodological triangulation, there is no explicit indication that the 
rationale for such work rests on open systems concerns.  
 
                                                 
8 Cobham (2003) studied MPC minutes and decisions over 62 months from 1997-2002. He cited 
uncertainty (of various types) as a contributory factor to the decision on 30 occasions. 20 of those 30 
periods resulted in no change. 20 of the 32 remaining periods resulted in no change.  Rather, there is much more evidence of closed-systems thinking
9. The process of 
projection undertaken by the Bank is very much of what Dow (1990) calls an ‘event-
predictive’ type. The effectiveness of the prediction is assessed by its accuracy (even 
acknowledging the range of the fan chart) according to subsequent events: it is an ‘event-
truth’ assessment (Dow, 1990). While qualitative data could be employed to make 
predictions about processes underlying data, without making specific event projections, 
instead it is used to adjust the event-prediction generated by the formal quantitative 
models. Such event-predictive action is symptomatic of closed systems: in open systems, 
the various sources of openness, such as the multiple and intermittent action of 
mechanisms, the organic, changing nature of material, and the shifting boundaries of the 
system itself would all mitigate against the effectiveness of prediction per se.  
 
3.4 Policy implications 
 
We advocate methodological triangulation because we hold that it has practical benefits. 
It allows some of the problems of working in uncertain, open environments to be 
addressed and hopefully mitigated. Furthermore, we see methodological triangulation as 
a coherent strategy in response to the nature of the world. Dow (2004) advocates Keynes’ 
ordinary logic, scepticism about formal methods and role for judgement as a response to 
that world. Triangulation fits into that view well: methods are applied to problems as 
appropriate; relevant evidence, whatever its source, adds to the weight of one’s argument 
and provides greater confidence for action. If, as Dow suggests, the Bank implicitly 
embraces that outlook, we applaud it: it stands out in contemporary economics. However, 
Dow’s commentary implies that the Bank needs to move even further: we support her 
claim. In particular we urge the Bank to develop a specific rationale, and subsequently 
strategy, for its mixing of methods.  
 
What difference could it make? One puzzle which faces the Bank is that, on casual 
observation, there seems to be a systematic tendency in the main model and in the MPC 
forecasts to overestimate the rate of inflation; i.e., the economy tends to undershoot the 
forecast. Now, from an open-systems perspective, the inability to predict correctly is 
unsurprising: because of the factors cited above, there would be no expectation to predict 
correctly. However, a systematic bias is intriguing. The undershooting could simply be a 
function of the way in which economic agents react to policy announcements. As Bell-
Kelton (2005) notes, every intonation and even facial expression of Greenspan is 
analysed to ascertain the likely economic future, as seen by the FOMC, and therefore 
future interest rate changes. Thus, if the tone of the Bank’s Governor is always unduly 
pessimistic about inflation, agents could react by expecting future rate increases, thereby 
slowing the economy. Interestingly, based on Cobham’s (2003) study, it appears that, 
faced with what he calls “wider” uncertainty (which is comparable to Dow’s, 2004, 
unquantifiable uncertainty), MPC members were more likely to act than they were when 
faced with uncertainty about either model parameters or data quality
10.  
                                                 
9 In addition, the theoretical models employed assume long-run equilibrium and expect that regular 
successions of events will occur. In open systems, neither would occur.  
10 On 9 occasions of wider uncertainty, changes were made on 4 occasions. For data and parametric 
uncertainty the ratios were, respectively, 8:1 and 7:1.   
However, other explanations of the overestimates are possible. One obvious source could 
be the preferences of the economists and policy makers towards conservatism and 
towards low inflation. However, it is possible that the overestimation might arise from 
the mixture of methods used; the type(s) of model employed; the composition of the team 
of investigators; and the data used. One simple hypothesis is that overestimation is the 
consequence of the theoretical basis of the model, which has an in-built bias against 
demand and inflation, via a long-run upward-sloping Phillips curve. An alternative 
macroeconometric model with, say, the assumption that investment in the short run has 
long-run employment effects (through capacity), might generate different forecasts (see 
Arestis and Sawyer, passim). Theoretical triangulation could also be achieved by having 
a more diverse range of views on the MPC. This diversity would then feedback into the 
types and specifications of models used.  
 
This leads to several concrete proposals, which can only be introduced here. First, the 
Bank needs to be clearer in its acknowledgement of its epistemological position; and it 
must develop more explicit mechanisms for the exercise and legitimisation of judgement 
in its process. Second, it should continue to use, and indeed expand, its use of different 
data types drawn from different philosophical positions. Third, it should embrace greater 
theoretical diversity, either through its models or through the composition of the MPC. 
Strategies of the Bank for hiring staff could also assist in this process: as Smith (1994) 
notes, as modelling teams change, models can change. In terms of methodological 
triangulation, this paper has pushed the case for between-method triangulation. Two 
obvious ways of achieving this are possible. One, there is more scope than is presently 
explored for qualitative prediction along the lines discussed in Dow (1990). The notion of 
‘asymmetric tightening’ is already used in FOMC announcements in the USA (see Bell-
Kelton, 2005). Finally, as Dow (2004) has shown, and as we have affirmed, the MPC 
meetings involve the imposition of qualitative judgements on quantitative data: this is 
methodological triangulation through the back door. Given our stance, we advocate an 
even greater role for judgement in the process. 
 
There are several constraints on these proposals. Qualitative prediction may have value, 
and indeed be just as useful as a probability distribution of predicted outcomes (as in the 
fan chart). However, the Bank faces the requirement to produce a quantitative estimate. 
This requirement is partly legislative: the formation of the MPC is part of the 
independence of the Bank; independence requires transparency. Equally, though, it 
derives from the demands of markets and from the conventions of economists. Thus, 
transparency requires that the Bank’s decision-making be clear to those examining it; the 
majority of observers will use primarily quantitative tools; therefore, the Bank is 
restricted to orthodox tools. However, we can find no evidence within the Bank’s 
literature of a desire to move away from the conventional tools, methods and means of 
understanding and predicting the economy.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has considered the process of data generation at the Bank of England, 
principally that designed to serve the needs of the Monetary Policy Committee. The 
Bank’s processes of data generation have been analysed in terms of their use of 
triangulation. Triangulation can take many forms and have many motivations. The 
Bank’s processes do indeed exhibit triangulation, principally of data, judgement, and 
investigators. There is also evidence of within-methodological triangulation. There is less 
evidence of between-methodological triangulation and little of theoretical diversity. 
However, the triangulation is based mostly on pragmatic considerations, such as data 
absences or lags, the failure of theoretically coherent (single, narrow paradigm) models in 
earlier eras, the inferior predictive performance of the Bank’s models in previous periods, 
and the need to reach credible forecasts which largely conform with those produced by 
external agencies.  
 
Supporting Dow (2004), there is some evidence that the strategy is driven by uncertainty. 
There is only very limited evidence that triangulation is adopted for other epistemological 
reasons such as fallibilism, or because of ontological concerns, except for the 
acknowledgement of a complex reality. For instance, where other data types are utilised, 
this appears to be a compromise necessitated by circumstances, rather than a commitment 
to the notion that quantitative models are inherently flawed because there might be a 
disjuncture between the methods and the reality they are attempting to capture (either 
now or into the future). There is little evidence, in fact, of a coherent rationale for, or 
strategy of, triangulation.  
 
Several practical recommendations follow for the creation of projections for and by the 
MPC. There is little evidence of theoretical pluralism within the Bank’s approach. The 
Bank’s main model is essentially a New Keynesian-orthodox hybrid, emphasising 
optimisation but market clearing inhibited by real and nominal sluggishness, plus 
elements such as money supply endogeneity and a NAIRU (Arestis and Sawyer, 2002). 
We recommend that this be addressed. While there is an awareness of the failure of past 
single-paradigm models, there is no commitment to theoretical pluralism per se: 
deviations from a theoretical norm are permitted only where this leads to greater 
empirical coherence (Pagan, 2003) in the form of better predictions. Second, whilst the 
use of suites of models and data types other than the conventional quantitative is to be 
applauded from the perspective of triangulation, the Bank’s approach remains one in 
which quantitative modelling has primacy. Where qualitative data is used, for instance in 
affecting the mean forecast of inflation, it is first quantified and then inputted into the 
model. This final step is unnecessary and, from the perspective of triangulation informed 
by open systems, it is potentially damaging.  
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